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Article 3

FAIR COMMENT IN LITERARY CRITICISM
Fair comment on literature, drama, and the arts today
rests upon a fixed and relatively stable interpretation of
the law. In other fields of jurisprudence, new cases constantly bring new precedents, old rulings are changed and
revised. But in the field of fair comment on artistic productions, it is possible today to examine the evidence and know
the landmarks of this field of law. Economic conditions have
been the chief contributing factor in establishing this seemingly firm ground in the shifting quicksand of the legal landscape.
For thirty years, fair comment in literary criticism has
been static and unaffected by surrounding change. Its history began in the early 19th century, its history ended to all intents and purposes - in the first decade of the
twentieth. Since that time, there have been few if any cases
search of the American Digest system fails to reveal any
listed under fair comment in literary criticism for all the
thirty years.
Thus, it has become possible to survey and analyze this
legal territory from the vantage ground of the historian, to
trace its development and growth, to track down its causes,
to estimate its effects. Putting it under the microscope of
history, we may discover how it got that way and why. But,
first, a word of warning. It is not accurate to minimize or
depreciate fair comment in literary criticism as a funereal
dead-letter or a legal corpse. Its influence is alive and active
every day of the year. It affects every book published in
this age of printing press epidemics, casts its shadow over
every critic who meets the literary disease with his hypodermic needle of comment. And with radio daily assuming
new importance in our national life, radio comment may
bring new problems.
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Two main reasons have brought about this unusual situation. First, the critics have -been able to benefit by resolved
doctrine; they know how far they can go and where it is
wise to stop. Secondly, and more important from its practical effects, publishers and authors of today have found it
more advantageous to play ball with the critics than to antagonize them. Offend the tribunal of literary despots with
the power of literary life and death! It is not healthy and
it is certainly poor business. For reviewers hold their jobs
long and publishers have other books forthcoming in the
future while authors flower on every bush.'
Whether this is a healthy condition in the literary body is
a matter of doubt but that is a literary question; the law has
little to do with the sanitary hygiene. of belles lettres.
Fair comment in literary criticism concerns two vital and
fundamental rights - the right of the individual and the
right of society. These rights, which so often have clashed
in practice and principle, sometimes collide through the
catalytic effect of criticism, and then we have a potential
case for the judge and jury. For society's good we have accepted the principle of fair comment - not only in the field
of literary and other forms of criticism but in the broader
territories of the administration of justice and government,
the management of public institutions, the conduct of religious bodies and all matters of bona fide public interest. Fair
comment is our watchdog of press freedom in action. For
the individual's protection, however, we have the laws of
libel and slander. When the boundaries of fair comment are
transgressed, the libel statutes put a punishing muzzle on
the watchdog.'
1 "Authors and publishers don't sue critics who crack down on them, not because they believe in turning the other cheek, but because they know that their
existence depends upon newspaper notice, good or bad, and that a cantankerous
author or publisher is apt to be wholly ignored," writes Alexander Lindey, of
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, New York, in a letter to the author. Lindey collaborated with Morris Ernst, of the same firm, in writing a popular and entertaining book on libel and slander entitled, HOLD YOUR TONGUE!, Methuen, 1936.
the individual's good name 2 "It is to protect this valuable possession that the law of libel has been developed even as men have developed laws to pro-
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When an author feels that a critic has dealt with him
unfairly and harshly, has maliciously or spitefully attacked
him and his work, then he can have recourse to the courts
for redress. And at various times through the years, various
authors have availed themselves of this privilege. Let us examine some of these cases.
Back when the 19th century was cutting its eye-teeth and
barely out of swaddling clothes, a certain publisher, Tabart
by name, printed and vended books for children. Tipper, in
his "Satirist or Monthly Meteor," accused Tabart of publishing immoral and absurd literature, really quite improper.
Tabart, injured in reputation and business, brought suit. And
the result of the case was that Lord Ellenborough held the
defendant, Tipper, under a plea of not guilty, might adduce
evidence, to show that the supposed libel was a fair stricture
upon the general run of the plaintiff's (Tabart's) publications. But, that although it was lawful for an author (Critic
Tipper in this case) to animadvert upon the conduct of a
bookseller in publishing books of an improper tendency, it
was actionable to impute to him falsely the publication of an
immoral or absurd literary production. And Tipper admittedly had done just that. The verdict was for plaintiff, with one
shilling damages.'
The next important case was that of Carrv. Hood,' also in
1808, and this time the important question of what is comment was passed upon. Sir John Carr was the author of a
book titled THE STRANGER IN IRELAND and Hood had printed
a parody of his creation. Thereupon Sir John brought suit for
libel charging that the parody had been "false, scandalous,
malicious, and defamatory" and that a gross caricature of
his dignity had been used as a frontispiece. Despite all this,
however, our Lord Ellenborough laid down the following
obiter dicta:
tect their personal safety, their money and their property." William R. Arthur
and Ralph L. Crosman in THE LAw oF NEWSPAPERS, McGraw-Hill (1928) 2.
s Tabart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 (1808), English Reports, vol. 170.
4 1 Camp. 354 (1808), English Reports, vol. 170.
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"We really must not cramp observations upon authors and their
works. They should be liable to criticism, to exposure, and even to
ridicule, if their compositions be ridiculous. . . Reflection on personal
character is another thing. Show me an attack on the moral character
of this plaintiff, or any attack upon his character unconnected with his
authorship, and I shall be as ready as any judge who ever sat here to
protect him; but I cannot hear of malice on account of turning his
works into ridicule. . . The critic does a great service to the public,
who writes down any vapid or useless publication such as ought never
to have appeared. He checks the dissemination of bad taste, and prevents people from wasting both their time and money upon trash. I
speak of fair and candid criticism; and this every one has a right to
publish, although the author may suffer a loss from it. Such a loss the
law does not consider as an injury; because it is a loss which the party
ought to sustain. It is in short the loss of fame and profits to which
he was never entitled. Nothing can be conceived more threatening to the
liberty of the press than the species of action before the court. We
ought to resist an attempt against free and liberal criticism at the
threshold."

The jury found for the defendant.
In this charge to the jury, Lord Ellenborough laid down
the firm and lasting foundation for fair comment in literary
criticism, a foundation which has endured without alteration
and whose broad principles hold as true today as they did
a hundred and thirty years ago.
Other cases have emphasized other standards for fair
comment in literary criticism but they have never altered the
basic criteria here established. Several American trials have
been effective in reiterating these criteria. That criticism
never attacks the individual but only his work was brought
out strongly in Triggs v. Sun Printing& PublishingAssociation.5 In 1903 the New York Sun published three articles
ridiculing Professor Oscar Lovell Triggs of the Department
of English of the University of Chicago. They referred to
Triggs as "the hammer of hymn writers," "the scourge of
Whittier and Longfellow," "a brass band and a skyrocket."
They said he had spent months of pregnant, "solemn consultation" in naming his baby and called his activities a
5

179 N. Y. 144 (1904).
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"theatrical advance agent," a "dazzling promotion." Triggs,
shamed by such digs, brought suit and Triggs collected, for
the court held:
"The articles complained of represent the plaintiff as illiterate, uncultivated, coarse, and vulgar, and his ideas as sensational, absurd, and
foolish...

They also ridicule his private life...

In short, they affect

to represent him as a presumptuous literary freak. These representations concerning his personal characteristics were not within the bounds
of fair and honest criticism, and are clearly libelous per se...
"The single purpose of the rule permitting fair and honest criticism
is that it promotes the public good, enables the people to discern right
from wrong, encourages merit, and firmly condemns and exposes the
charlatan and the cheat, and hence is based upon public polity. The
distinction between criticism and defamation is that criticism deals
only with such things as invite public attention or call for public comment, and does not follow a man into his private life, or pry into his
domestic concerns. It never attacks the individual, but only his works.
A true critic never indulges in personalities, but confines himself to the
merits of the subject matter, and never takes advantage of the occasion to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of matters
of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste. The
articles in question come far short of falling within the line of true
criticism, but are clearly defamatory in character, and are libelous
per se."

James Fenimore Cooper, central figure in many a case
arising out of his literary creations, plays the leading role in
another American suit which stressed the rule that criticism
never imputes dishonorable motives unless justice requires
it and then only on the clearest proofs. In Cooper v. Stone, 6
he brought suit against the then president of Columbia University, charging that Stone, in a review of Cooper's THE
HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

had libeled him by imputing to the author "a disregard of
justice and propriety as a man," representing him "as infatuated with vanity, mad with passion, and the apologist
from force of sympathy of another stigmatized with ingratitude and perfidy," and charging him "with publishing as
true, statements and evidence falsified, and encomiums re6 24 Wend. 434 (1840).
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tracted." The court held the review to be libelous in its imputation of dishonorable motives and judgment was found
for Cooper on demurrer.
Criticism never gratifies private malice, a point well demonstrated in Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., and
7 in which it was shown that a review printed in
another,
PUNCH on a volume of memoirs by Frederick Moy Thomas
was libelous and that the criticism was actuated by malice,
malice which existed before it was even published and again
demonstrated in the courtroom by the reviewer. The court
found that comment which is thus actuated by malice cannot be deemed fair on the part of the person who makes it
and therefore proof of malice may make a criticism that is
prima facie fair, outgide the limits of fair comment. Thomas
was awarded three hundred pounds damages, the defendants
appealed, and the appeal was denied.
But if the criticism confines itself to the work in hand,
even gross exaggeration and ridicule may be permitted. In
Strauss v. Francis,' where the defendants, publishers of the
literary review, the ATHENAEUM, themselves admitted the
alleged libel of an "abominable" novel by Strauss, Chief
Justice Cockburn held that "it was of vast importance that
criticism, so long as it was fair and reasonable and just,
should be allowed the utmost latitude, and that the most unsparing censure of works which were fairly subject to it
should not be held libelous... It was all very well for the
plaintiff's counsel to contend that literature should be free
and unfettered. Be it so. But, then, if you give, on the one
hand, the utmost latitude to literary composition, there ought
to be at least the same latitude to literary criticism."
The Athenaeum won.
Thus we have a body of precedent established, precedent
which may be summarized in the following four principles:
7 2 K. B. 627 (1906).
8 4 F. & F. 1107 (1866), English Reports, vol. 176.
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1.

Fair comment deals only with such things as invite
public attention or public comment.'

2.

Fair comment never attacks the individual, only his
work. But here gross exaggeration or ridicule may be
permitted. I"

3.

Fair comment never imputes dishonorable motives unless justice requires it and then only on the clearest
proofs."

4.

Fair comment never gratifies private malice.' 2

In the trial of libel cases arising out of literary criticism,
certain fundamental precedents also have been laid down.
These may be epitomized as follows:' 3
1. Where the defendant pleads and proves justification
of a libel containing comment or criticism, it is unnecessary
for him to raise any other defence. Under ancient British
law, the truth of the charges contained in the libel is a complete defence in civil proceedings, for the law "will not permit a man to recover damages for injury to a character which
he does not or ought not to possess." '" This type of defence is known as a plea of justification. In order to succeed
in it, the defendant must establish the substantial truth of
the whole of the libel. The plea of justification "involves the
9 Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235 (1877), 23 Am. Rep. 322; Dibdin v. Swan
and Bostock, 1 Esp. 28 (1793); Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 355 (1808); Henwood v.
Harrison, L. R., 7 C. P. 606 (1872), 41 L. J. C. P. 206, 20 W. R. 1000, 26 L. T.
938; Dowling v. Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N. W. 225, 62 Am. St. Rep. 702,
32 L. R. A. 104 (1896).
10 Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 355 (1808); Tabart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 (1808);
Merivale v. Carson, 20 Q. B. 275 (1887).
11 Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434 (N. Y. 1840); Campbell v. Spottiswoode,
3 F. & F. 1107 (1863), English Reports, vol. 176.
12 Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 23 Am. Rep. 322 (1877); Dowling v.
Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N. W. 225, 62 Am. St. Rep. 702, 32 L. R. A. 104
(1896).
13 Summary based on principles laid down in TnE LAW Or LIBEL AND
SLANDER, by W. Valentine Ball and Patrick Browne, Stevens and Sons, 1936;
PamciLmS OF THE LAW OF LiBEL AND SLANDER, by Wilfred A. Button, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1935.
14 Barrow v. Lewellin, Hobart 62 (Star Chamber) (1615); McPherson v.
Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263 (1829).
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justification of every injurious imputation which a jury may
think is to be found in the alleged libel." 1'
If the defendant cannot justify his expression of opinion
in this sense, he may be able to fall back upon the defence
that they are, a fair comment on a matter of public interest,
and this plea, if made out, is a complete answer to a libel
action. A successful defence of fair comment essentially must
demonstrate that the facts upon which the comments complained of are based are truly stated. Therefore the defendant is under obligation at the very beginning of establishing
the truth of the facts commented upon and also the fairness
of his comments. Much wider obligations are incurred by the
defendant pleading justification for he must establish the
truth of every injurious imputation which the jury believes to
be contained in the matter under dispute while in fair comment, "The allegation of truth is confined to the fact averred,
and the averment as to the comments is not that they are
true but only that they were made in good faith and that
they are fair and do not exceed the proper standard of comment upon such matters." is
2. It is for the judge to decide, as a question of law,
whether the matter to which the comment relates is one of
public interest."
3. Defence of fair comment protects only statements of
opinion - it does not extend to defamatory allegations of
fact. It is for the jury to say in each case what view they take
of the statements. The category to which the several statements belong is a question for the jury, subject to direction
from the judge. 8 (A book review containing a charge of
plagiarism against the author may be given as an illustratiori of an allegation of fact introduced into a literary criticism.)' 9
15
16

17
18

19

Digby v. Financial News, 1 K. B. 502 (1907).
Sutherland v. Stopes, A. C. 47 (1925).
M'Quire v. Western Morning News, 2 K. B. 100 (1903).
Hunt v. Star Newspaper, 2 K. B. 309 (1908).
Joynt v. Cycle Trade Publishing Co., 2 K. B. 292 (1904).
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4. The document containing the comment may or may
not also state the facts on which the comment is based; in
either case the defendant must prove the truth of the stated
or assumed facts if the plaintiff disputes it. The comment
must not misstate facts, because a comment cannot be fair
which is built on facts which are not truly stated. Comment,
in order to be fair, must be based on facts, and if a defendant
cannot show that his comments contain no misstatements of
fact, he cannot prove a defence of fair comment.2 If the
defendant makes a misstatement of any of the facts upon
which he comments, it at once negatives the possibility of
his comment being fair.2 '
5. Comment must be relevant - personal attacks on the
author would almost always be irrelevant.2 2
6. Even if the defendant satisfies the above points, the
plaintiff will still succeed if he proves by extrinsic evidence
that the comment was prompted by malice.2"
7. It is for the plaintiff to show publication of alleged
libelous matter and that this material goes beyond the limits
of fair criticism. Once the plaintiff has established the publication by the defendant of defamatory words which are
capable of being construed as an unfair comment, the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant.2 4
Some confusion arises on occasion as to the distinction between Fair Comment and Qualified Privilege, and Fair Comment and Justification. The following concise statements
may serve as a guide.2"
Contrast with qualified privilege: A privileged occasion is
one on which the privileged person is entitled to do some21

Hunt v. Star Newspaper, 2 K. B. 309 (1908).
Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., and another, 2 K. B. 627 (1906).

22

Fraser v. Berkeley, 7 C. & P. 621 (1836).

20

28 Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., Ltd., and another, 2 K. B. 627 (1906).
24 M'Quire v. Western Morning News, 2 K. B. 100 (1903).
25

Summarized from PRINCIPLES OF MHELAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER, by Wil-

fred A. Button, Sweet and Maxwell, 1935.
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thing which no one, who is not within the privilege, is entitled to do on that occasion. A person in such a position may
say or write about another things which no other person is
entitled to say or write. But in the case of criticism upon a
published work every person is entitled to do and is forbidden to do exactly the same things, and therefore the occasion
is not privileged.2"
Contrast with justification: In order to justify a libel the
defendant must establish the truth of every injurious imputation which is contained in it but in fair comment, the allegation •of truth is confined to the fact averred, and the averment as to the comments is not that they were true but only
that they were made in good faith and that they are fair
and do not exceed the proper standard of comment upon
such matters."
Question of fact and comment: The question of what is
fact and what is comment is one for the jury and in order to
obtain the advantage of the protection afforded by this defence, the defendant must satisfy them that the statements
complained of are comment only and do not amount to statements of fact, to which the only defence will be privilege
or justification.28
In the United States, all forty-eight of the states have
constitutional provisions bearing indirectly upon fair comment either through the approach of libel or freedom of the
press.2 9
26 Henwood v. Harrison, 7 C. P. 606 (1872); Arnold v. The King Emperor,
30 T. L. R. 462 (1914).
27 Digby v. Financial News, 1 K. B. 502 (1907); Sutherland v. Stopes, A. C.

47 (1925).
28 Hunt v. Star Newspaper, 2 K. B. 309 (1908).
According to a survey made by William R. Arthur and Ralph L. Crosman
in 1928 and published in their TnE LAW OF THE NEWSPAPERS, McGraw-Hill, 1928,
and THE RIGHTS AND PRizmrEs OF THE PREss, by Frederick Seaton Siebert, D.
Appleton-Century, 1934, statutory provisions upon libel (again affecting fair comment) are to be found in all the states with the exception of Arizona. These
authors also cite three states - New York, New Mexico, and Texas - as having
definite statutes upon their books in regard to fair comment. These statutes are
as follows:
29
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A number of questions arise, ethical and moral questions,
which have an important philosophical bearing upon the subject.
Is fair comment in the public good?
This question has been answered already, answered many
times. It is interesting to note, however, that it was set at
rest with complete finality in one of the first cases of fair
comment in literary criticism to be tried. Said the learned
Lord Ellenborough:
"Liberty of criticism must be allowed or we should have neither
purity of taste nor of morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary to
the truth of history and the advancement of science. That publication,
therefore, I should n~ver consider a libel which has for its object not to
injure the reputation of any individual, but to correct misrepresentation of fact, to refute sophistical reasoning, to expose a vicious taste
in literature, or to censure what is hostile to morality." 3o

The point then arises whether there should be any bounds
upon fair comment in literary criticism if admittedly it is for
the public good. As this question raises the whole ethical
philosophy of public versus private right, an exhaustive examination would be interminable. However, good sense itself dictates the reply that when the individual is grossly
harmed through the exercise of comment, ostensibly fair, he
should certainly have the right to redeem his tarnished reputation. If the comment is not fair, nobody can gainsay the
individual's right of legal redress, and even when it is fair,
the individual should be able to demand a test of that fairNew Mexico: 1727. Criticism and Opinions, Sec. 277.-It is no offense to publish any criticism or examination of any work of literature, science, or art, or any
opinion as to the qualifications or merits of the author of such work.
New York: Penal Code, Consolidated Laws, Chap. 41, Sec. 1342.-The publication (of a libel) is excused when it is honestly made, in the belief of its truth
and upon reasonable grounds for this belief, and consists of fair comments upon
the conduct of a person in respect of public affairs, or upon a thing which the
proprietor thereof offers or explains to the public.
Texas: Art. 1284. Not libelous 4. To publish any criticism or examination of any work of literature, science
or art or any opinion as to the qualifications or merits of the author of such work.
5. To publish true statements of fact as to the qualifications of any person
for any occupation, profession, or trade.
30
Tabart v. Tipper, 1 Camp. 350 (1808), English Reports, vol. 170.

FAIR COMMENT IN LITERARY CRITICISM

ness. Society itself demands a bound upon the extent of comment for its own-protection; it has placed such a boundary
marker in criminal libel.
Out of the inquiry there comes a subsequent query
should the public, also for its own protection, demand that
qualifications and standards be set upon the critic enthroned
in his ivory tower for its benefit? And if the reply is "Yes,"
what shall these standards be?
Morris Ernst has suggested a board of official admirers
whose job it shall be to defend and answer the critic who
has stung the author.3 ' One of the provisos of his scheme
is an arbitrary requirement that the answer must be printed
in full in equivalent space and position.2" Apart from the
purely practical defect that few if any newspaper or magazine publishers- would consent to such a plan, there is the
even more serious flaw that the very nature of such a laudatory committee would make its critical estimates valueless
they would always have to be eulogies of the most sickening nature. And how would you set up standards "for the
critics of the critics?
The answer of common sense again would seem to be that
you cannot set a yardstick for knowledge. If the critic is
good, if he is fair, he will hold his job. If not, the libel laws
and universal laughter will soon make an end of him. And
the answer also lies in the hands of the forthright and able
author who has enough courage to expose folly and presump'31 HoLD YOUR TONGUE I by Morris L. Ernst and Alexander Lindey, pp. 133137.
32 Under Comp. L. § 10506 of Nevada, for example, a similar solution is
offered for dealing with such problems. This section compels a newspaper, under
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment, to publish a signed denial submitted to it
concerning any identifiable person who has been the subject of an article in the
paper. The section does not require that the article be libelous, although the
"lead-line" to it reads "Denial of libelous article must be published." The article
may simply have been erroneous. The denial or correction must be printed if submitted within one week of the original publication in the case of a newspaper
pliblished daily within Nevada, or within thirty days in the case of'other periodicals. The denial or correction must be printed in the next issue after its receipt
except in the case of its submission within two days of such issue. It shall be given
like position and space. If it takes up more space than the original, the newspaper may charge regular advertising rates for the excess matter.
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tion in the critical chair. Authors genuinely interested in
their art and its immaculate virginity rather than seductive
movie rights can put an end to any critic who produces inept
and incompetent merchandise. Through their own writings,
published in books, periodicals, and even "letters to the
editor," they can pillory the critic who repeatedly exposes
his own ignorance and incapacity.
Then, digging into the heart of the matter, if you confine
comment to the product and so not allow it to invade the
field of private character, is this ethically desirable from the
larger viewpoint? In the personal opinion of the writer, the
answer has to be "Yes." Should an author whom you know
to be a reprobate and a scoundrel, a scoundrel perverted in
mind and body, be allowed to publish his ideas and opinions
and theories? You may say that if those ideas and opinions
and theories as presented in his book are innocuous, there
should be no bar. But even then do you not build up an audience for this man in the future which may receive his future
books with ready enthusiasm, books which may be as bad as
the man himself? Yes, but the answer has to be that the
future must take care of itself. When the bad book appears,
then is the time to knock its ears down. If even a dog is entitled to his day in court, then you must judge by the product
and not by the producer.
From an esthetic standpoint, it undoubtedly raises a problem for the modern expressionist critic who judges the man
and his work as one and almost inseparable, finding the man
in the work and the work in the man. And, in this connection,
who can really divorce the man from his brain-child. But
that is a critical problem and our answer now has to be that
the critic as every other man has to observe the "Don't" signs
of legal liability.
In this ethico-legal tangle is another pitfall - is malice
ever justified? And, if so, is it libelous? In practicality, can
you separate malice from justifiable comment? If a book
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reviewer is given a book to review, a book by a confessed
communist, a book advocating free love, the downfall of the
American republic and the distribution of all millions including the publisher's, how much of his comment is going to
be justifiable and how much malice?
Here, of course, the basic answer is to be found in the
law itself.
"In order to justify a libel the defendant must establish the truth
of every injurious imputation which is contained in it, but in fair comment, the allegation of truth is confined to the fact averred, and the
averment as to the comments is not that they are true but only that
they were made in good faith and they are fair and do not exceed the

proper standard of comment upon such matters." 3.3
These and similar questions which might be raised demonstrate the human fallibility of the law, it is true, but common sense and keen intellectual reasoning - the basis in
the last analysis of jurisprudence - show -the way to the
solution. And a re-examination of the cases cited above and
the points of law involved will clearly demonstrate that the
bench and bar have set worthy precedents in this field.
Fair colmnment in literary criticism may be a closed book
insofar as active litigation is concerned, but it is closed only
because the rulings of the past have established literary and
legal rights on a firm foundation of sound and rational
equity. Critical liberty is the foundation stone of both democratic government and artistic progress. Without it, the
blight of censorship and suppression kills every prospect of
advance and every hope of individual freedom and creative
development. The individual must be protected, it is true,
and the laws of libel protect him, but society itself would
suffer and slide back a thousand years if the privilege of fair
comment were destroyed.
James L. C. Ford.
Madison, Wisconsin.
83 PlRmcinLEs OF THE LAW OF LBE. AND SLANDER, by Wilfred A. Button,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1935.

